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Beginning at least with the last third of the 20th century, and con-
tinuing through the present, the notion of sculpture has undergone 
a radical redefinition. In essence, sculpture has come off [of] its 
pedestal, functioning in the space in and around its site, and play-
ing an integral role in defining that space. 
—Daniel Ranalli, Professor of Art History at Boston University1 
The Visual Artists Rights Act is of the utmost importance to pro-
fessional artists who build their future on the integrity and au-
thenticity of . . . [art] in public and private collections and to the 
public for preserving its cultural legacy . . . . Any distortion of such 
works is automatically a distortion of the artists’ reputation and 
cheats the public of an accurate account of the culture of our time . 
. . . Artists . . . must sustain a belief in the importance of their 
work if they are to do their best. If there exists the real possibility 
that the fruits of this effort will be destroyed after a mere ten to 
twenty years the incentive to excel is diminished and replaced 
with a purely profit motivation. The Visual Artists Rights Act 
mitigates against this and . . .  protects our historical legacy.  
—Weltzin Blix, Sculptor, testifying before the Subcommittee on      
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice2 
                                                                                                                    
 ∗  J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Florida State University College of Law. I would like 
to express my gratitude to Professor Fernando Tesón for teaching such a wonderful and ex-
tremely interesting class on Law & the Arts. Additionally, I want to thank the individual 
editors & staff members of Volume 35 for their dedication to this journal. 
 1. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95 (D. Mass. 2003). 
Professor Ranalli testified as an expert on behalf of artist David Phillips.  
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 6 (1990). 
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I’m not sure if I’ve helped artists or hurt artists in this battle . . . It 
was probably very naïve of me to think that artist rights would 
prevail over real estate and power. 
— David Phillips, Artist3 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 What does a herd of Black Angus cattle in New York have in com-
mon with city planners in Sarasota, Florida? Both are unexpected in-
terlopers into the world of site-specific art. Art is site-specific when 
its locality or surrounding environment plays an integral role in the 
meaning and interpretation of the work.4 Because site-specific art is 
designed for particular locations, removal from a specific location ar-
guably mutilates or destroys the integrity of the work, whether or not 
the actual art piece is physically altered.5 
 When called upon to resolve conflicts over site-specific art, the 
United States’ legal system has faced a balancing act between the 
rights of artists who wish to protect the integrity and creativity of 
their work and the rights of property owners—both public and pri-
vate—who do not want to have their use of real property hindered by 
the placement of artwork.  
 In the recent case of Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., the 
U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) did not apply to site-specific art.6 Was this 
the correct decision? What role will this decision play in defining the 
rights of site-specific artists? Will that court’s reasoning influence the 
treatment of site-specific art by other courts?  
 Unfortunately, the First Circuit appears to have missed the mark 
when it ruled that site-specific art was wholly unprotected by VARA. 
Instead of removing an entire genre of visual art from VARA’s pro-
tection, the court should have merely applied the statute using the 
standards and guidelines provided by Congress to determine whether 
the legislation protected artist David Phillips’ site-specific work. Art-
ists who create site-specific art should not be excluded from the legis-
lative cloak of protection afforded by VARA merely because of their 
chosen art form. In short, the Phillips decision sets a bad precedent 
for the future of fledgling artistic moral rights in this country. 
                                                                                                                    
 3. Geoff Edgers, U.S. Court of Appeals Deals Blow to Artist’s Fight Against Fidelity, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2006, at E6. 
 4. Rebecca J. Martel, Comment, The Should-It-Stay or Should-It-Go Spotlight: Pro-
tection of Site-Specific Art Under VARA, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 101, 
112 (2003). 
 5. Jill R. Applebaum, Comment, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis 
Based on the French Droit Moral, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 213-14 (1992); Patty 
Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist: Artists’ Rights and Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 454 (1994). 
 6. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006). 
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 Part II of this Note will explore the site-specific art movement to 
gain a better understanding of the legal issues that can arise when 
site-specific artists choose to forever tie their work to fixed locations. 
Next, Part III will look at the development of both foreign and do-
mestic legal treatment of visual art to examine the types of protec-
tions that exist for visual artists. This Note will then address the 
Phillips decision in Part IV and explain why the First Circuit’s deci-
sion stripped site-specific artists of more than just the ability to pre-
vent removal of their work from a specific location. Part V will dis-
cuss the legal future of site-specific art in light of the Phillips ruling 
and suggest ways that artists and property owners can better deal 
with the hurdles that arise when site-specific art is designed and in-
stalled on real property. 
II.   THE SITE-SPECIFIC ART MOVEMENT 
 Parties unexpectedly affected by site-specific art can range from 
bovines to city planners. In Garrison, New York, a one-hundred-and-
forty-acre farm recently became the site of an exhibit featuring 
thirty-five site-specific art pieces.7 The exhibit shared space with a 
herd of Black Angus cattle that roamed the farm. The cows re-
sponded to the objets d’art with curiosity and a healthy appetite: 
A silver, spaceshiplike sculpture made by Gregory Slick has been 
dented by the cows; a series of large, rust-covered Styrofoam balls 
made by Grace Knowlton gets nudged around almost daily. A 
three-part sculpture of a peace sign by Justin Allen keeps being 
upended. One piece, a sculpture of decorative grasses by Pat Lal-
trella, has been eaten twice, and the area where the sculpture once 
was now sits barren.8 
“In our prospectus to the artists, we made it clear that the pieces had 
to be cow friendly—no cables, no pointy edges, no holes,” said one of 
the organizers of the exhibit. “What we didn’t realize was that every-
thing also had to be cow proof . . . . [The cows are] very curious.”9 The 
exhibit was sited on private land with the permission of the property 
owner, an environmentalist and prominent community figure.10 Even 
with the unexpected bovine interferences, the farm owner has appre-
ciated the site-specific art. In discussing the exhibit, he explained 
that he “love[s] having an opportunity for people to come up and 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Abraham Streep, At a Sculpture Exhibition, the Cows Come Home, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 24, 2006, § 14WC, at 12. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
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walk on the farm and see the beautiful views . . . . Some of the art is 
very ephemeral, and some of it will stay for a long time.”11 
 More often, site-specific artists encounter interference or criticism 
from the more human end of the spectrum. This can lead to compli-
cated legal problems, especially when the artist has transferred own-
ership of the site-specific work. In January 2006, city planners in 
Sarasota, Florida, held public forums with residents over the fate of 
“Memory Path,” a site-specific work by artist Athena Tacha.12 “Mem-
ory Path” is a trail of granite slabs spanning the city’s Selby Five 
Points Park.13 The slabs contain etched images illustrating Sara-
sota’s history.14  
 Produced over fifteen years ago, “Memory Path” has not aged well. 
Some of the pieces are cracked and broken—“[t]he patched-up stone 
gives it the look of a shabby graveyard, and the significance of most 
of the pictured people and places is unexplained. Some are upside-
down or sideways, too.”15 Other pieces are faded beyond recognition.16 
The dilapidated “Memory Path” soon found itself at the center of con-
troversy. The city wanted to give the park a new look—a goal driven 
by efforts to develop the downtown area.17 City officials were faced 
with the decision of whether to repair and keep the work as it was 
originally designed, relocate it within the park, or remove it com-
pletely from the park. The artist, Tacha, considered “Memory Path” 
to be unique in her body of work and understandably wanted a say in 
how the city would deal with the site-specific piece.18  
 As the two above examples show, site-specific art does not always 
hold up in its surrounding environment as well as the artist planned. 
Additionally, site-specific art can be found on both private (the farm 
in Garrison, New York) and public property (the park in Sarasota, 
Florida), which can make its legal treatment complicated depending 
on the goals and wishes of the parties involved. 
 Site-specific art developed out of the “land art” movement in the 
1960s, where artists aimed to “de-com[m]odify” visual art and sought 
to remove it from the “sterile context” of fine art museums.19 One 
                                                                                                                    
 11. Id. 
 12. Mike Saewitz, Another Dispute over Art for City—Officials Want to Move Memory 
Path, but the Artist Is Protesting, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., Jan. 31, 2006, at B1. 
 13. The Art of Compromise: Acceptance of Offer Would Be Best for Public Art, 
SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., July 20, 2006, at A10. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Saewitz, supra note 12. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Francesca Garson, Note, Before That Artist Came Along, It Was Just a Bridge: The 
Visual Artists Rights Act and the Removal of Site-Specific Artwork, 11 CORNELL J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 203, 235 (2001). 
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pioneer of the site-specific art movement described its genesis as a 
time when “[t]hings were shifting radically . . . . Artists were finding 
new spaces, and galleries were tangential. We said then, ‘Painting is 
dead.’ ”20 
 The overriding goal of site-specific artists is to orchestrate rela-
tionships between their work, the surrounding environment, and 
viewers.21 These relationships, not just the physical objects made by 
the artist, then become the substance of the piece.22 Another way of 
understanding site-specific art is to see it as a form of “integrated 
art,” where a piece of art is made from two or more objects that must 
be presented together for the work to be whole and have complete 
meaning.23 Site-specific art exists when one of these integrated ob-
jects consists of the physical location of the work.24 Site-specific art 
can be found indoors or outdoors. Interior works may use videos, 
sounds, photography, paintings, and even live performances.25 Exte-
rior site-specific art can blend in and conform to the surrounding 
space or alter and intrude into the location.26 The media used for 
outdoor works can be materials found at the site (such as leaves, 
flowers, branches, and rocks)27 or foreign material brought in to pro-
vide contrast with the surrounding area.28 
 Site-specific art is often encountered in the context of works com-
missioned to enhance the visual appeal of public buildings and out-
door locations.29 Because site-specific art relies so heavily upon its lo-
cation, the meaning and completeness of a site-specific work is ar-
guably threatened every time there is a change to that surrounding 
environment. In the absence of express contractual terms between an 
artist and a commissioning entity, artists turn to the courts to pro-
tect the integrity of their site-specific works when faced with en-
croaching development or proposed modifications. 
                                                                                                                    
 20. Elizabeth Cook-Romero, When Jupiter Aligns with Art, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, 
Mar. 24, 2006, at A46 (quoting artist Nancy Holt). 
 21. Garson, supra note 19, at 235. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 129 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Fredric Koeppel, Site Specific and Sensitve—Displays of Art Incorporate the Time 
and Place and Space Continuum, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Mar. 2, 2007, at G34. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Elizabeth Langton, Students Create Art from Nature at Arboretum: Organic 
Sculptures Use Material from Site, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 2006, available at 
2006 WLNR 20056066. 
 28. See Barbara Isenberg, NY Public Art Turns a Corner, and Some Heads, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 27. 2006, at 40 (describing a site-specific work located in a plaza near Central 
Park consisting of a building fragment filled with toothpicks, towels, plants, and other 
random items). 
 29. Carrie Jones, Comment, Site-Specific Art Parks on Moral Ground: Distilling Old 
Whine in New Battles over the Visual Artists Rights Act, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 355, 
380 (2005). 
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III.    SITE-SPECIFIC ART AND THE LAW 
A. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works 
 For over a century, artists outside the United States have received 
and benefited from developed legal protections that address more 
than the economic rights set forth in copyright and trademark laws. 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, initially drafted in 1886, is “[a]n international copyright 
treaty providing that works created by citizens of one signatory na-
tion will be fully protected in other signatory nations.”30 In addition 
to protecting basic copyright and trademark rights (identified as 
“economic rights”), Article 6bis of the Berne Convention recognizes 
the broad “moral” rights31 of artists: 
 (1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after 
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to 
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, muti-
lation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in  rela-
tion to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation. 
 (2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the pre-
ceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least 
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by 
the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the 
country where protection is claimed.32 
 Although the Convention was passed over a century ago, partici-
pation in the Convention has exploded in just the past few decades. 
As of November 2007, the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
which administers the Berne Convention, reports that 163 countries  
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 30. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
 31. The “moral” rights referred to throughout the paper are distinguishable from “eco-
nomic” rights, which are often the rights protected by copyright law. “Moral” rights thus 
are very different from an artist’s right to protect their ability to profit financially from 
their creativity. For a good discussion of the background and development of artists’ 
“moral” rights, see Applebaum, supra note 5, at 190-96.  
 32. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, 
Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
99-27 (1986), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].  
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are contracting parties under the treaty.33 When the United States 
joined the Convention in March of 1989, there were roughly half as 
many participating countries as there are today.34  
 The Berne Convention has been viewed by the United States as 
an executory treaty,35 which requires implementing legislation to 
give effect to the Convention and provide a cause of action under the 
domestic laws of a country.36 Article 36, addressing the application of 
the Convention, obliges signatory nations to adopt necessary meas-
ures, stating: 
 (1) Any country party to this Convention undertakes to adopt, in 
accordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure 
the application of this Convention. 
 (2) It is understood that, at the time a country becomes bound by 
this Convention, it will be in a position under its domestic law to 
give effect to the provisions of this Convention.37 
 When the United States joined the Convention in 1989 via pas-
sage of the Berne Implementation Act, it had yet to pass implement-
ing legislation that would expressly recognize the artistic moral 
rights recognized under the Berne Convention. This implementing 
legislation came a year later in the form of the Visual Artists Rights 
                                                                                                                    
 33.  World Intellectual Property Organization, Statistics, Berne Convention of Sept. 9, 
1886, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/statistics/StatsResults.jsp?treaty_id=15&lang=en 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2007). 
 







 34. Id. 
 35. Eric M. Brooks, Comment, “Tilted” Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights Af-
ter U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1441-42 (1989). 
 36.  
[This] Court distinctly recognised the distinction between an executory 
treaty, as a mere contract between nations, to be carried into execution 
by the sovereign power of the respective parties, and an executed treaty, 
effecting of itself the object to be accomplished, and defined the line be-
tween them thus: “Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the 
land. It is consequently to be regarded in courts of justice, as equivalent 
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid 
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation im-
port a contract; when either of the parties stipulate to perform a particu-
lar act; the treaty addresses itself to the political, not to the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can 
become a rule for the Court.”  
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 746-47 (1838) (quoting Foster & 
Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). 
 37. Berne Convention, supra note 32, art. 36. 
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Act of 1990, discussed below in Part III.C.2. Even with the United 
States’ entry into the Berne Convention, artistic rights in this coun-
try differ greatly from those exercised in Europe, where the Berne 
Convention originated. 
B. European Treatment of Site-Specific Art 
 An artist’s moral rights, which Article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion protects, are French in origin.38 France explicitly recognizes the 
doctrine of le droit moral, which evolved as a natural and personal 
right rather than a pure legal right.39 The bundle of rights conferred 
upon artists by le droit moral includes the right to share their work 
with the public, the right to amend a published work or withdraw it 
from the public eye, the right of acknowledgement or attribution for 
creation, and notably, the right to maintain and preserve the integ-
rity of their artwork.40 This acknowledgment of an artist’s moral 
right in his or her work stems from the view that artistic creation is 
sparked by an artist’s soul, thus there is a special link between an 
artist and his or her work.41 In France, all “works of the mind” re-
ceive equal protection.42 Accordingly, site-specific art is protected un-
der French law to the same extent as other creative works.43  
 Illustrative of France’s protective stance towards artists is the 
case of Jean Dubuffet’s struggle to have an ambitious site-specific 
sculptural project completed.44 Dubuffet designed an environmental 
sculpture for the courtyard of the Renault company’s new headquar-
ters.45 The company, under the direction of a new president who was 
not enthusiastic about the project, halted work halfway through the 
project.46 Dubuffet sued, claiming that the moral right of integrity 
entitled him to have the work, Salon d’Ete, completed.47 France’s Su-
preme Court of Cassation ultimately ruled that, even though Renault 
had already paid Dubuffet for his design, the artist still had an inter-
est in exercising his right of integrity in the work; he could legally 
compel completion of the project. 48 In the end, Dubuffet did not exer-
cise this right since he did not wish “to impose by constraint the 
                                                                                                                    
 38. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 420 (5th ed. 
2007). 
 39. Applebaum, supra note 5, at 183-84. 
 40. Id. at 183. 
 41. Id. at 184. 
 42. Id. at 187. 
 43. Id. at 214. 
 44. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 443. See also Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Ar-
tistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A Comparison of Droit Moral Between France 
and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 361, 397 (1998). 
 45. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 443. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Swack, supra note 44, at 397. 
 48. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 443. 
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completion of a work in a place where it has been so disrespectfully 
treated.”49  
 Because France recognizes le droit moral as covering all artistic 
works equally, any disputes arising over site-specific work would be 
dealt with in a manner consistent with any other art form. This dif-
fers greatly from the treatment of site-specific art in the United 
States, where the right of integrity was only given effect in 1990 
when Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). The 
protections of this Act do not apply to every situation involving an ar-
tistic work of creation—instead, for a piece of art to receive protection 
under VARA, it must first meet the statutory definition of a work of 
visual art.50 
 Germany and Italy, like France, have long-established laws pro-
tecting an artist’s moral right of integrity. German law gives an art-
ist protection against any distortion of his or her work that would 
“prejudice his lawful intellectual or personal interests in the work.”51 
Italian law recognizes a right against “distortion, mutilation or any 
other modification thereof capable of prejudicing his honour or repu-
tation,” yet this right has some qualifications when it involves works 
of architecture (where modifications are sometimes needed in the 
course of construction or after completion).52 In some cases, the artist 
may be entrusted with the design and execution of these necessary 
modifications.53 Additionally, an artist is not entitled to intervene 
and prevent any modifications for which the artist had notice of and 
gave consent.54 In contrast to European countries like France, Ger-
many, and Italy, the United States is a newcomer to recognizing and 
defining the moral rights of visual artists. 
C.   Domestic Treatment of Site-Specific Art 
1.   Prior to the Passage of VARA: Serra v. U.S. General Services 
Administration 
 Prior to the passage of VARA, the most publicized and controver-
sial case in the United States focusing upon a piece of site-specific art 
involved Richard Serra and his work “Tilted Arc.”55 The sculptural 
piece was a one-hundred-and-twenty-foot long, twelve-foot tall, steel 
                                                                                                                    
 49. Swack, supra note 44, at 397. 
 50. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing the qualifications for a 
piece of art to receive the protections of VARA). 
 51. Germany, Law of 9 Sept. 1965, Art. 14, reprinted in MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 
38, at 426. 
 52. Italy, Law of 22 Apr. 1941, Art, 20, No. 633, reprinted in MERRYMAN ET AL., supra 
note 38, at 426. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. Art. 22. 
 55. Serra v. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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arc designed for the Federal Plaza in lower Manhattan.56 Serra exe-
cuted a contract with the General Services Administration (GSA) 
that, in addition to setting forth the basic terms of the commission, 
stated that “all designs, sketches, models, and the work produced 
under this Agreement . . . shall be the property of [the United 
States].”57 
 Soon after installation of the arc, GSA began receiving complaints 
about the appearance and obstructive size of the work.58 Public hear-
ings were held to determine whether the work should be removed.59 
Complaints at the hearings ranged from the aesthetic—the work was 
ugly and destroyed the coherence and openness of the plaza60—to the 
scientific–the large structure could amplify the damage from a bomb 
blast.61  
 The GSA Administrator ultimately decided to relocate the work, 
triggering a lawsuit by the artist.62 Since there was no recognized 
moral right of integrity in the United States at the time, Serra’s 
claims were grounded in the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, federal trademark and 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Id. at 1046-47. 
 57. Id. at 1047. 
 58. Id. 
 59. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 784. 
 60. Douglas C. McGill, Office Workers and Artists Debate Fate of a Sculpture, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1985, at B1. 
 “Good morning, my name is William Toby,” said Mr. Toby, regional 
administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration, and one of 
the first speakers. “During my 17 years of employment in this building, 
nothing has offended me and my staff more than the erection of this 
huge, rusted metal barrier. I am here today to recommend its reloca-
tion to a better site - a metal salvage yard.”  
 In tone and substance, Mr. Toby’s remarks reflected the views of 
many other employees of the Federal building, public officials and some 
neighborhood residents, who spoke in favor of the Government’s re-
moval of the sculpture.  
 The piece, they said, is not only ugly and a target for graffiti, but 
has also effectively ended the use of the plaza, at Foley Square, for con-
certs and other public gatherings.  
Id. 
 61. Id.  
 Vickie O’Dougherty, a General Services Administration employee 
whose specialty is building security, testified at the hearing that the 
protection of Federal buildings against terrorist attacks has been an in-
creasing concern of the agency, and that the “Tilted Arc” increases the 
potential damage that would result from a bomb.  
 “The sculpture could vent an explosion both upward and toward the 
building,” Miss O’Dougherty said. “If there were to be an explosion, we 
can expect a great deal of danger in terms of glass shattering.”  
Id. 
 62. Serra, 847 F.2d at 1048. 
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copyright laws, and state law.63 None of these claims proved success-
ful.  
 In response to the First Amendment claim, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals first noted that the government owned the art; 
therefore it, not Serra, the work’s creator, was the “speaker” of the 
expressive ideas behind “Tilted Arc.”64 The court then found that, as-
suming Serra did retain any First Amendment interest in the display 
of “Tilted Arc,” the removal of the work was a permissible time, 
place, and manner restriction since the GSA had the authority and a 
significant interest in keeping the Plaza free from obstruction. 65 Ad-
ditionally, relocation of “Tilted Arc” would not prevent Serra from 
expressing his ideas in alternate ways. Importantly, the court noted 
that “[n]otwithstanding that the sculpture is site-specific and may 
lose its artistic value if relocated, Serra is free to express his artistic 
and political views through the press and through other means that 
do not entail obstructing the Plaza.”66 Lastly, the court found that the 
decision to remove the work was not impermissibly content-based.67 
It accepted GSA’s explanation that the decision was based on the 
functional reason of maintaining the open space of the Plaza.68 
 Regarding Serra’s due process claims, the court found that the 
artist had no protected property interest in having “Tilted Arc” re-
main in the Plaza.69 The court acknowledged that even though Serra 
would possibly suffer injury or harm to his reputation as a result of 
the sculpture’s removal or relocation, it was not an injury to a consti-
tutionally protected property or liberty interest.70 
 Underlying the Second Circuit’s analysis of Serra’s claims was the 
contractual agreement outlining the terms of the commission.71 Since 
the contract relinquished ownership of the artwork to the govern-
ment, the court concluded that Serra had bargained away his right to 
control the duration and location of “Tilted Arc.”72 The Second Circuit 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief, clearing the way for the site-
specific sculpture to be severed from its location, irrespective of the 
work’s meaning and the artist’s wishes.73 “Tilted Arc” was cut into 
several pieces and removed from the Plaza.74 It sat in an outdoor 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1049. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1050. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1052. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 1049. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1052. 
 74. Daniel B. Schneider, F.Y.I., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, § 14, at 2. 
178  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:167 
 
government parking lot for ten years and, in September of 1999, was 
finally moved to a storage building in Maryland.75  
 Although Serra did not win the legal battle over “Tilted Arc,” the 
lawsuit illustrated the legal issues faced by site-specific artists when 
the viewing public does not “take” to a piece of art. These issues were 
hovering in the background when Congress drafted VARA. 
2.   The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
 To give effect to the moral rights recognized under the Berne Con-
vention, the United States Congress passed legislation amending the 
Copyright Act of 1976 to recognize two specific types of artistic 
rights.76 The amendment, called the Visual Artists Rights Act 
(VARA),77 grants artists the moral rights of integrity and attribution. 
These rights may be waived but are nontransferable.78 Aside from a 
                                                                                                                    
 75. Id. 
 The General Services Administration, which had commissioned 
“Tilted Arc” in 1979 for $175,000, plucked the sculpture from its site 
on March 17, 1989, and stored it in three stacked sections in an out-
door government parking lot in Brooklyn, at Third Avenue and 29th 
Street. Interviewed at the time, Mr. Serra said, “If they ever use the 
name ‘Tilted Arc,’ or my name in connection with those three steel 
plates, I’ll sue them.” 
 The toppled arc sat in the lot for 10 years. “Passing motorists 
probably didn’t even know it was there,” said Renee Miscione, a 
spokeswoman for the General Services Administration. Last Sep-
tember, the three 50-ton sections were moved by flatbed truck to a 
storage building in Middle River, Md., where they were unloaded 
and stacked by an oversized 80-ton forklift. The move cost $36,000. 
Ms. Miscione said the pieces would remain in “indefinite storage.” 
 Ms. Miscione said that because of the unusual history of the 
work, “Tilted Arc” is of potential interest to scholars. “The G.S.A. will 
not destroy or discard the pieces,” she said. “However, we will honor 
Richard Serra’s wishes, and we will not erect it anywhere else.”  
Id.  
 76. Jones, supra note 29, at 357. 
 77. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-501 (1990)). 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2000). 
 (e) TRANSFER AND WAIVER.— 
 (1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not be transferred, 
but those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such 
waiver in a written instrument signed by the author. Such instru-
ment shall specifically identify the work, and uses of that work, to 
which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply only to the 
work and uses so identified. In the case of a joint work prepared by 
two or more authors, a waiver of rights under this paragraph made 
by one such author waives such rights for all such authors. 
 (2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with re-
spect to a work of visual art is distinct from ownership of any copy of 
that work, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright 
in that work. Transfer of ownership of any copy of a work of visual 
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few exceptions, VARA applies to works of visual art created after 
June 1, 1991, VARA’s effective date.79 The right of integrity, as set 
forth in VARA, encompasses an artist’s ability:  
 (A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her 
honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or 
modification of that work is a violation of that right, and 
 (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, 
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is 
a violation of that right.80 
Before an artist can claim protection under VARA’s right of integrity, 
however, the work must meet several important qualifications. Pri-
marily, it must qualify as a work of visual art, as defined by the 
Act.81 This definition includes paintings, drawings, prints, photo-
graphs (produced “for exhibition purposes only”), or sculptures, exist-
                                                                                                                    
art, or of a copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright, shall 
not constitute a waiver of the rights conferred by subsection (a). Ex-
cept as may otherwise be agreed by the author in a written instru-
ment signed by the author, a waiver of the rights conferred by sub-
section (a) with respect to a work of visual art shall not constitute a 
transfer of ownership of any copy of that work, or of ownership of a 
copyright or of any exclusive right under a copyright in that work.  
Id. 
 79. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 610 (stating an effective date of six months after the date of 
enactment, which was Dec. 1, 1990). 
(b) APPLICABILITY.–The rights created by section 106A of title 17, 
United States Code, shall apply to— 
 (1) works created before the effective date set forth in subsection 
(a) but title to which has not, as of such effective date, been trans-
ferred from the author, 
And; 
 (2) works created on or after such effective date, but shall not ap-
ply to any destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification 
(as described in section 106A(a)(3) of such title) of any work which 
occurred before such effective date.  
Id. 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(3) (2000). 
 81. Id. § 101. 
A “work of visual art” is— 
 (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single 
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, 
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that 
are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or 
other identifying mark of the author; or 
 (2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes 
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a 
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecu-
tively numbered by the author.  
Id. 
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ing in a single copy, or produced in limited edition of two hundred 
copies or fewer.82 Expressly excluded from VARA’s definition of a 
“work of visual art” are objects such as maps, posters, books, mer-
chandising or advertising items, and works made for hire.83 Addi-
tionally, if an artist wishes to prevent a modification, distortion, or 
mutilation of a work, the artist must show that it would be “prejudi-
cial to his or her honor or reputation.”84 If an artist seeks to prevent 
destruction of a piece of his or her work, the artist must show that it 
is a “work of recognized stature.”85 
 VARA contains several exceptions that play prominent roles in 
the conflicts between site-specific artists and property owners. Con-
gress recognized several common practices of the artistic community 
and inserted exceptions to address the nonstatic existence of visual 
art86—outside sculptures may erode due to the elements or materials 
used; conservation efforts may be necessary to counteract the aging 
                                                                                                                    
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
A work of visual art does not include— 
 (A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, 
model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, 
magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information 
service, electronic publication, or similar publication; 
 (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descrip-
tive, covering, or packaging material or container; 
 (iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii); 
 (B) any work made for hire; or 
 (C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title. 
A “work made for hire” is— 
 (1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or 
 (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contri-
bution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material 
for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written 
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work 
made for hire. For the purpose of the foregoing sentence, a “supple-
mentary work” is a work prepared for publication as a secondary ad-
junct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, 
concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or 
assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, 
pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical 
arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, 
and indexes, and an “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or 
graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in 
systematic instructional activities.  
Id. 
 84. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
 85. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 86. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17 (1990). 
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process of a painting; artwork may need to be moved to accommodate 
new works or to better display the piece.  
 For site-specific art, the most important of these exceptions is the 
“public presentation” exception:  
 (c) Exceptions.— 
 (1) The modification of a work of visual art which is a result of 
the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials is not a 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsec-
tion (a)(3)(A). 
 (2) The modification of a work of visual art which is the result of 
conservation, or of the public presentation, including lighting and 
placement, of the work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, 
or other modification described in subsection (a)(3) unless the 
modification is caused by gross negligence.87 
This exception allows for the modification of a work of visual art, in-
cluding changes to the lighting and placement of the work. A con-
gressional committee report discussed the application of this excep-
tion: 
Under [the exception], galleries and museums continue to have 
normal discretion to light, frame, and place works of art. However, 
conduct that goes beyond presentation of a work to physical modi-
fication of it is actionable. For example, Representative Markey 
described the actions of two Australian entrepreneurs who cut Pi-
casso’s “Trois Femmes” into hundreds of pieces and sold them as 
“original Picasso pieces.” This is clearly not a presentation ques-
tion. On the other hand, the Committee believes that the presenta-
tion exclusion would operate to protect a Canadian shopping cen-
ter that temporarily bedecked a sculpture of geese in flight with 
ribbons at Christmas time.88 
 Likewise, Congress foresaw problems involving artwork attached 
to or physically incorporated into buildings and included a “building 
exception.”89 Because of real property interests and the legal conflicts 
                                                                                                                    
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c). 
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17. 
 89. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2000). The “building exception” states: 
 (d)(1) In a case in which— 
 (A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building 
in such a way that removing the work from the building will cause the de-
struction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as described 
in section 106A(a)(3), and 
 (B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the building ei-
ther before the effective date set forth in section 610(a) of the Visual Artists 
Rights Act of 1990, or in a written instrument executed on or after such effec-
tive date that is signed by the owner of the building and the author and that 
specifies that installation of the work may subject the work to destruction, dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification, by reason of its removal, then the 
rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply. 
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that could arise when art is “built” into a structure, the building ex-
ception provides property owners with guidelines for determining 
when the right of integrity applies to incorporated works and gives 
detailed notice provisions for owners to follow before a work is re-
moved from a building.90  
 With regard to site-specific art, the closest that Congress came to 
expressly addressing its treatment under VARA was the following 
statement in a committee report: “Generally, the removal of a work 
from a specific location comes within the [public presentation] exclu-
sion because the location is a matter of presentation, unless the work 
cannot be removed without causing the kinds of modifications de-
scribed in proposed subsection 106A(a)(3).”91 The modifications ad-
dressed by that proposed subsection were any intentional or negli-
gent acts or omissions which resulted in “destruction, distortion, mu-
tilation, or other modification . . . which would be prejudicial” to the 
artist’s reputation or honor.92  
 Since the passage of VARA, courts have addressed several aspects 
of the legislation, such as the meaning of recognized stature,93 
whether a work is made for hire,94 and to what extent artwork at-
tached to buildings was protected under VARA.95 It was not until 
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc. that a federal appellate court 
                                                                                                                    
 (2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is 
a part of such building and which can be removed from the building without 
the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as de-
scribed  in section 106A(a)(3), the author’s rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) 
of section 106A(a) shall apply unless— 
 (A) the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to no-
tify the author of the owner’s intended action affecting the work of visual art, 
or 
 (B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person so notified 
failed, within 90 days after receiving such notice, either to remove the work or 
to pay for its removal.  
Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 17. 
 92. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2000). 
 93. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming a district 
court’s finding that a large metal sculpture was of recognized stature such that it was pro-
tected by VARA); Scott v. Dixon, 309 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that a six 
thousand pound swan sculpture was not of recognized stature under VARA since it was 
kept in the sculptor’s backyard (which was not visible to the public), no expert testified as 
to the artistic merit of the piece, and it was never displayed so that it could receive review 
by the artistic community). 
 94. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that a large 
walk-through sculpture installed in a lobby was a work made for hire). 
 95. Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 
DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *7-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (discussing VARA’s “building 
exception” and its application to a three-dimensional piece of artwork attached to a twelve-
story condominium building). 
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was faced with the direct application of VARA’s right of integrity to a 
work of free-standing site-specific art.  
IV.   POST-VARA: PHILLIPS V. PEMBROKE REAL ESTATE, INC. 
 After the passage of VARA, courts began to address the scope and 
applicability of the statute.96 Left unanswered until 2006 was the 
question of how and if VARA applied to site-specific art. The U.S. 
First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Phillips v. Pembroke Real Es-
tate, Inc. that VARA did not apply to or protect site-specific art at 
all.97  
 This important site-specific art dispute arose in Massachusetts, 
where a three-year legal battle was waged over a grouping of sculp-
tural works by David Phillips.98 The pieces were sited throughout a 
one-acre park in South Boston.99 Fidelity Investment originally paid 
Phillips $575,000 to design the park, which is located outside of 
Pembroke Real Estate, a company owned by Fidelity.100 The artist’s 
nautical-themed design for the park was comprehensive. The court 
described the project in detail:  
Phillips created approximately twenty-seven sculptures for the 
Park, comprised of fifteen abstract bronze and granite pieces and 
twelve realistic bronze sculptures of various aquatic creatures, in-
cluding frogs, crabs, and shrimp. Under the “Eastport Park Stone-
work Agreement”, Phillips was responsible for the design and in-
stallation of stone walls, granite stones inlaid into the Park’s 
walkways, and other landscape design elements. Most of Phillips’ 
work in the Park is organized along the diagonal axis running 
from the northeast to the southwest corner, at the center of which 
is his large spherical sculpture entitled “Chords”, the centerpiece 
of the Park, which Phillips personally carved from granite. 
 Phillips designed a bronze medallion with Zodiac signs, which 
crowns an S-shaped circular granite path, also of Phillips’ design; 
outlying sculptures off of the main axis (many bronze crabs, frogs, 
and shrimp and a large seashell); and the curve motifs. He worked 
with a stone mason to choose and place the rough lichen-covered, 
Maine-quarried stone, and he selected the large granite stones 
that he used as part of his sculptures to mirror the large granite 
stones along Boston Harbor. Phillips’ work in the Park is unified 
by a theme of spiral and circular forms.101 
                                                                                                                    
 96. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
 97. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 98. Edgers, supra note 3. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 130-31. 
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 Within a year of completion, Fidelity hired a landscaper to redes-
ign the park for improved accessibility.102 The company believed that 
there were conceptual problems with the design.103 Importantly, the 
original stone found throughout the park created maintenance prob-
lems.104 With the redesign, the company sought to simplify walkways 
and add more shade-conducive plants.105 The new design called for 
moving several of the large bronze and granite sculptures designed 
and sited by Phillips.106 Phillips brought suit against Pembroke Real 
Estate, Inc., the Fidelity-owned local real estate company that leases 
the parkland from the Massachusetts Port Authority.107 He was 
granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the removal or altera-
tion of the site-specific works in the park.108  
 Phillips argued that any redesign of the park requiring the reloca-
tion or removal of some or all of his site-specific work would violate 
his statutory rights under VARA and the Massachusetts Art Preser-
vation Act (MAPA).109 While the case was on interlocutory appeal in 
the First Circuit, the district court certified a question to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts about the application of 
MAPA to site-specific art.110 The state court ruled that MAPA did not 
protect the artist against removal of the type of art at issue.111 Al-
though MAPA prohibits the physical destruction of artwork,  
[it] does not protect [the work] against the conceptual destruction 
or decontextualization that may result from the removal of those 
components from the physical environment in which they have 
been placed. If the crafted components of site-specific art can be 
extracted from their surroundings without physical damage to 
them, the statute is not violated by their removal.112 
 In light of the state court’s decision on the state law issue, the dis-
trict court vacated the injunction.113 It entered judgment concluding 
that the federal law, VARA, applied to site-specific art but it was 
possible for Phillips’ work to be removed from the park since Pem-
broke’s wish to redesign the park fell under the public presentation 
exception.114 Phillips appealed to the First Circuit and challenged the 
                                                                                                                    
 102. Edgers, supra note 3. 
 103. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 131. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Edgers, supra note 3. 
 107. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 129-30. 
 108. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89, 93 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 109. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 129. 
 110. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 819 N.E.2d 579, 580 (Mass. 2004). 
 111. Id. at 580-81. 
 112. Id. at 581. 
 113. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 132. 
 114. Id. at 132. 
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lower court’s application of VARA’s public presentation exception to 
allow modification or removal of Phillips’ site-specific artwork.115  
 The First Circuit’s analysis of Phillips’ VARA claim focused on 
what it considered to be a flaw in the district court’s ruling: VARA 
applied to site-specific art, but allowed the removal of Phillips work 
under the public presentation exception.116 To the First Circuit, it did 
not make sense that VARA would apply to site-specific art yet allow 
it to be removed from the statute’s protection via an exception.117 The 
circuit court framed the question at issue as “[e]ither VARA recog-
nizes site-specific art and protects it, or it does not recognize site-
specific art at all.”118  
 Phillips’ arguments on appeal likewise attacked the district 
court’s decision for allowing modification of his work under the public 
presentation exception.119 The artist agreed with the lower court’s 
ruling that VARA applied to site-specific art, but he challenged the 
ruling that the public presentation exception allowed the removal of 
his work from the park.120 On appeal, the artist claimed that the 
words “presentation” and “placement” were ambiguous with regard 
to location.121 Relying upon the construction canon of noscitur a so-
ciis,122 he claimed that the use of the word “lighting” related to 
“placement” such that both words should be read to mean nonper-
manent changes in public presentation.123 Underlying the nonperma-
nent interpretations of “lighting” and “placement” was the notion 
that the object must be moveable for the public presentation excep-
tion to apply.124 The First Circuit did not agree with Phillips’ logic—it 
saw this interpretation of the public presentation exception as creat-
ing a “dual regime.”125 Under this interpretation, VARA and its terms 
would mean one thing when applied to moveable art (that is, art that 
is not site-specific) and would have a different meaning when applied 
to site-specific art that is nonmovable.126 The court took the position 
that if VARA had been intended to cover site-specific art in a manner 
that differed from its application to other types of art, then the stat-
ute would have expressly discussed site-specific art and explained 
                                                                                                                    
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 140. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. “A canon of construction holding that the meaning of an unclear word or phrase 
should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(8th ed. 2004).  
 123. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 141. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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how to differentiate between art forms that would be covered by site-
specific protection and those that would not be covered.127 
 The First Circuit ultimately ruled that VARA does not apply to 
site-specific art at all.128 It based this decision on the logic that VARA 
would not “protect site-specific art and then permit its destruction by 
removal” under the statute’s public presentation exception.129 It af-
firmed the district court’s ruling that Phillips’ work could be removed 
from the park, but rejected the district court’s approach to using the 
public presentation exception.130 The First Circuit did not reach the 
application of the exception since it found that site-specific art was 
wholly unprotected by VARA.131  
V.   WHY COURTS SHOULD APPLY VARA TO SITE-SPECIFIC ART 
 Unfortunately, the Phillips court missed the mark when it ruled 
that VARA does not apply to or protect any site-specific art. The First 
Circuit’s approach in Phillips obliterates site-specific artists’ ability 
to claim not only the right of integrity, but also the right of attribu-
tion afforded by VARA. In one fell swoop, the court removed a spe-
cific art form from the protection of the broadly drafted legislation. 
Instead, the First Circuit should have recognized that the statute 
does not discriminate based on art form. VARA covers a broad range 
of visual arts, including site-specific art, and its application should be 
dealt with on a case-by-case basis using the standards and exceptions 
established by Congress.  
 In defining what was covered by VARA, the statute provides a 
broad definition for works of visual art. Nowhere does the statute at-
tempt to limit the protections of VARA based on art-form or style. In-
stead, its application is limited by only a handful of clear definitions, 
specific exceptions and flexible standards that accommodate the dy-
namic world of visual art. If a work falls within the broad definition 
of a work of visual art, then VARA applies to it and a court must 
then determine if the exceptions and standards apply to the specific 
situation: 
 The courts should use common sense and generally accepted 
standards of the artistic community in determining whether a par-
ticular work falls within the scope of the definition. Artists may 
work in a variety of media, and use any number of materials in 
creating their works. Therefore, whether a particular work falls 
                                                                                                                    
 127. Id. at 142. 
 128. Id. at 143. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id.  
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within the definition should not depend on the medium or materi-
als used.132 
 Congress intentionally drafted several standards for evaluating 
whether a specific work was protected by VARA’s right of integrity. 
For a work of visual art to be protected from distortion, mutilation, or 
modification, the artist must show that the proposed changes “would 
be prejudicial to [the artist’s] honor or reputation.”133 To prevent de-
struction of a work, the artist must show that the piece is “a work of 
recognized stature.”134 Both of these standards require a court to ana-
lyze case-by-case whether the work should receive protection under 
the right of integrity.  
 Prior to passage of VARA, the appropriateness of these two stan-
dards—“honor or reputation” and “recognized stature”—were dis-
cussed. As initially introduced in H.R. 2690, VARA established a per 
se standard of protection for works of a “recognized stature.”135 How-
ever, a congressional committee recognized that interjecting such a 
stiff, inflexible standard into the world of visual art would create bat-
tles of experts over whether a work was of the appropriate stature 
and importance.136 Instead, the rigid standard was replaced with the 
more accommodating and adaptable “honor and reputation” stan-
dard.137 The committee report stated that “the formulation for deter-
mining whether harm to honor or reputation exists must of necessity 
be flexible.”138 This standard of honor and reputation would allow a 
finder of fact to look at the way in which the work would be modified 
and examine how it would affect the professional reputation of the 
artist. This concern with the inclusion of a more flexible standard 
like an individual artist’s reputation and not the harder to achieve 
“stature of the work” standard was rooted in the nature of the ever-
changing world of visual art. The committee remarked that, histori-
cally, many masterpieces, styles, and art forms had not been appre-
ciated at the time they were created.139 Under a flexible standard 
based on the individual artist’s reputation, an artist would not need 
to prove a certain standing in the artistic community before claiming 
the right of integrity embodied in VARA: 
 An artist’s professional and personal identity is embodied in 
each work created by that artist. Each work is a part of his/her 
reputation. Each work is a form of personal expression (oftentimes 
                                                                                                                    
 132. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 11 (1990). 
 133. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2000). 
 134. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 135. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 15. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. 
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painstakingly and earnestly recorded). It is a rebuke to the dignity 
of the visual artist that our copyright law allows distortion, modifi-
cation and even outright permanent destruction of such efforts.140 
 This focus on individual artists and their individual works shows 
that VARA was to be interpreted and applied on a case-by-case basis 
and was not intended to exclude specific forms or styles of art, since 
certain styles of art may not have yet achieved positive recognition in 
the artistic community. Therefore, at its threshold, VARA should 
cover all works that fall under the broad definitions found in section 
101. The rights found in VARA then should be applied on a case-by-
case basis using both the flexible standards and the limited excep-
tions that address very specific circumstances, notably the public 
presentation and the building exceptions. 
 This is where the First Circuit failed in Phillips. It equated 
VARA’s coverage of a type of art to the protection of that type of 
art.141 The court did not seem to recognize that VARA could apply to 
a piece of site-specific art and not necessarily protect it in every 
situation.142 Additionally, the court erroneously emphasized that un-
der the plain language of VARA, site-specific art was not protected,143 
and furthermore, “the concept of site-specific art [was] never men-
tioned by name” in the legislative history of the statute.144 The court’s 
reasoning about the plain language of the statute did not adequately 
address that the broad statutory definition of a “work of visual” is 
based on the physical form of a work (such as a painting, sculpture, 
or drawing), not the genre or style. 
 Importantly, the court did not address that VARA codifies more 
than just a cause of action based in the right of integrity. With its 
ruling that VARA does not protect site-specific art at all, the First 
Circuit denied site-specific artists the ability to exercise the right of 
attribution, the other moral right established by the legislation. 
 The moral right of attribution can be equally important to a site-
specific artist as the right of integrity. The right of attribution in 
VARA states that an artist: 
 (1) shall have the right– 
 (A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
 (B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any 
work of visual art which he or she did not create; 
 (2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as 
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, 
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mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be 
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation;145 
 Thus, if a site-specific artist is unable to prevent modification of 
their work, then under the right of attribution, the artist could pre-
vent the use of their name in connection with the distorted work. 
 A key flaw in the Phillips decision is that it did not recognize that 
the public presentation exception would not be triggered in every 
site-specific art situation—not all cases would involve modification 
by removal from a location. Illustrative of this concept is the site-
specific work mentioned previously in Part II—Athena Tacha’s 
“Memory Path.” The work, consisting of granite slabs that tell the 
history of a city through placement and pictures, fell into a state of 
disrepair.146 The artist, Tacha, alleged that the problems arose due to 
a lack of maintenance and repair.147 Thus, the “modifications” and 
“distortions” of the work arose not from the city’s attempt to move 
the work, but from the negligence of the city in failing to maintain 
the work. Although VARA contains an exception to the right of integ-
rity when the modification is due to the passage of time or the inher-
ent nature of the materials,148 the issue of whether the damage to 
“Memory Path” falls under this exception or was caused by negli-
gence or intentional disrepair would be an issue for a finder of fact to 
determine. If a court were to follow the First Circuit’s ruling that 
VARA does not apply to site-specific art at all, any recovery under 
VARA would be blocked. Tacha would not even be able to exercise 
her right of attribution to keep her name from being associated with 
the ruined piece.  
 Another one of Tacha’s site-specific works that encountered prob-
lems, “Marianthe,” was designed in 1985 for a branch campus of the 
University of South Florida (USF).149 The property was sold years 
later to nearby Edison College.150 Like “Memory Path,” “Marianthe” 
suffered from maintenance and repair problems. Cracks had ap-
peared, allowing rain water to seep in and rust the supporting metal 
rods.151 In 1999, Edison College notified Tacha that “Marianthe” 
would be removed from the campus since it had become an unstable 
and dangerous structure.152  
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 Tacha claims that the original commissioning entity, USF, failed 
to follow Tacha’s maintenance instructions for “Marianthe,” and did 
not pass on the instructions to Edison Community College.153 In addi-
tion to providing maintenance instructions, Tacha’s contract with 
USF included an express maintenance clause that stated, “[t]he Uni-
versity shall keep the Sculpture in good condition and repair it and 
permanently display it . . . .”154 Since “Marianthe” had been designed 
and created before the passage of VARA, the statutory protections 
did not apply.155 However, even if VARA existed when the work was 
created and installed, under the First Circuit’s ruling, Tacha still 
could have been barred from bringing a cause of action under the 
statute since her work was site-specific. 
 Ultimately, Tacha entered into an agreement with the city of 
Sarasota about “Memory Path.” She waived her rights under VARA 
and agreed to not bring a claim against the city in return for 
$50,000.156 Tacha’s experience with the legal problems that can arise 
when public site-specific art interferes with property rights has in-
spired pessimism in her opinion on the genre’s future: 
“[u]nfortunately for artists and their art, ours is a society that places 
priority on change and economic growth, not on permanence or es-
thetic values. I wonder, what will be left behind as testimony of our 
public art a millennium, or even a few centuries from now.”157 
 The First Circuit’s ruling has construed VARA as being inapplica-
ble to a whole genre of art because the court did not understand how 
a statute could apply to a work of art and not protect it. Instead of 
making an effort to apply the broad terms of VARA, the court ruled 
that because site-specific art was not expressly mentioned in the 
statute, the whole genre was completely unprotected by the legisla-
tion. The court did not provide satisfactory reasoning for this deci-
sion. Ultimately, it should have recognized that, at its threshold, 
VARA covers all types of art that meet the broad statutory definition 
of a work of visual art. Upon finding that Phillips’ work satisfied this 
definition, the First Circuit should have then gone on to discern if the 
flexible standard of “honor and reputation” had been met and 
whether any of the exceptions applied. Even if the First Circuit had 
found that Phillips’ work could be moved or modified under the pub-
lic presentation exception, it would have at least recognized that 
VARA should be applied to situations involving site-specific art, 
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rather than removing the whole genre from the protection of the 
moral rights afforded by the statute. 
VI.   THE FUTURE OF VARA AND SITE-SPECIFIC ART 
 As the law currently stands, since only one federal circuit court 
has addressed the applicability of VARA to site-specific art, it is not 
clear how courts across the country will decide conflicts arising over 
this art form. If courts take the opposite approach of the First Circuit 
and consistently construe VARA to apply to and protect site-specific 
art, then artists and commissioning entities (both public and private) 
could better address the problems that may arise through contrac-
tual terms. 
 One valid concern the Phillips court discussed is the role that ar-
tistic moral rights could play in the encumbrance of public and pri-
vate land.158 However, since the rights recognized by VARA may be 
waived, commissioning entities concerned with the long-term place-
ment of site-specific art can request that artists waive their rights 
under VARA. Artists concerned about the permanence and integrity 
of their work can refuse to grant such waivers.  
 The waiver clause of VARA159 arguably weakens the protections 
afforded by the legislation since commissioning entities, through con-
trol of the purse strings, are often in a better bargaining position.160 
Artists attempting to obtain work that would give prominence to 
their names might rush to waive these rights in the hopes of securing 
work. However, if courts are willing to allow site-specific artists to 
recover under VARA, then artists familiar with the legal problems 
that can occur with this site-specific art may be less willing to waive 
their rights. As VARA currently stands, it is viewed as a piece of leg-
islation that “promises much and delivers little.”161 If courts aggres-
sively applied and upheld the rights guaranteed by VARA, then art-
ists would have the ability to make informed decisions concerning 
waiver provisions and the potential effects of contractual terms on 
their moral rights.  
 Artists could additionally insist upon other provisions in the con-
tract, such as a buyout clause, rather than an upfront waiver of all 
VARA rights. Instead of waiving VARA rights at the outset, an artist 
could agree to a contractual term where, after the passage of a set 
number of years, if the property owner wishes to move or modify the 
work, then the owner would have the option to purchase the artist’s 
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waiver of his or her right of integrity in the piece. This would allow 
the artist to delay the decision of waiving his or her VARA rights and 
would give the commissioning entity an avenue to obtain a waiver of 
the rights at a later time. 
 Additionally, if VARA is construed to cover site-specific work, then 
it would provide “default rules” to apply when a contract is silent 
about VARA rights. Since VARA provides standards and exceptions 
as to when the rights of integrity and attribution apply, courts would 
have a better framework for analyzing cases involving the modifica-
tion of site-specific art. Artists bringing claims under VARA would 
have to meet the statutory requirements and show that modifications 
would interfere with their honor or reputation or that the piece being 
destroyed is of recognized stature. Defendants in these cases could 
likewise present evidence showing why these standards have not 
been met. Without the guidelines of VARA, courts addressing these 
types of situations will not have a consistent framework to use in 
making their decisions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 The Phillips case is the first federal circuit court case addressing 
the application of VARA to site-specific art. Hopefully, future courts 
will not follow the First Circuit’s lead when faced with the same is-
sue. Because the visual art world is constantly changing and evolv-
ing, newer genres may seek the protections offered by VARA. In the 
absence of an express directive from Congress, courts should not ex-
clude whole genres of visual art from the protections afforded by the 
statute. Congress recognized the dynamic world of visual art and in-
tentionally drafted a statute that would have broad application to art 
found both on and off the pedestal. 
 
